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Abstract The emergence of the transnational as a site and object of governance 
has triggered concern amongst both affected publics subject to these effects, and 
scholars keen to locate the democratic potentials therein. Increasingly, public 
sphere theory is being promoted as a lens for interrogating the democratic 
potential of the transnational. However the project of transposing public sphere 
theory from its Westphalian origins to the transnational has been frustrated by a 
lack of empirical examples in which the properties of a transnational public 
sphere can be easily identified. In this article, examining the encounter between 
La Vía Campesina and the UN Committee on World Food Security, I argue for the 
existence of a nascent transnational public sphere in the specific domain of 
transnational food and agricultural policy-making. The existence of this concrete 
example, I argue, defends public sphere theory’s transnational turn against 
either the charge of utopianism, or the need to suspend some of the framework’s 
core conditions in order to accommodate the ‘actually possible’. It also allows us 
to advance public sphere theory’s empirical research agenda, and in this article I 
introduce an analytical framework to take this further. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of the transnational as a site and object of governance has 
triggered concern amongst both scholars seeking to interrogate the democratic 
potentials within such developments, and affected publics subject to their 
effects.1 Fundamental to this collective unease is an awareness that global 
governance arrangements have proliferated outside of anything resembling 
‘citizen’ engagement, leading to serious shortfalls in their legitimacy. Attempting 
to think through and act upon this ‘democratic deficit’, scholars have undertaken 
a number of key tasks. These include interrogating the normative basis of global 
governance arrangements; envisioning institutional innovations capable of 
remedying the democratic deficit; and, conducting empirical analysis of pre-
existing arrangements in relation to both.2  
 
                                                        
1 Donatella della Porta et al. (eds), Globalization From Below: Transnational Activists and Protest 
Networks (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Jan A. Scholte,  (ed.), Building Global 
Democracy: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); P. Nanz and J. Steffek, ‘Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere’, 
Government and Opposition, 39:2 (2004), pp. 314-335.  
2 E.g. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen, A Possible 
World: Democratic Transformations of Global Institutions (London: Zed Books, 2004); G. W. 
Brown,  ‘Safeguarding deliberative global governance: the case of The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria’, Review of International Studies, 36:02 (2010), 511-530; M. Bexell, J. 
Tallberg and A. Uhlin. ‘Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of 
Transnational Actors’, Global Governance, 16 (2010), 81-101; J. Dryzek, A. Bächtiger, and K. 
Milewicz, ‘Towards a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly’, Global Policy 2:1 (2011), 33-43; 
Scholte (ed.) (2011); J. Brassett and E. Tsingou, ‘The politics of legitimate global governance’, 
Review of International Political Economy,  18:1 (2011),  1-16; Daniele Archibugi, et al. (eds) 
Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 2012).  
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In recent years the idea of the ‘public sphere’ has started to provide critical 
traction for scholars exploring the democratic potential of the transnational. 
Public sphere theory is focused upon the extent to which those affected by 
political decision-making, or affected publics, have historically been and are 
currently able to critically contest and influence the direction of political 
decision-making through discourse in the context of the Westphalian state.3 In 
part as a response to the undermining of the state as the locus of democratic 
participation by the emergence of transnational issues, actors, relations, and 
governance (e.g. international finance, environmental and ecological 
degradation, trade), the theoretical framework has been transposed to the 
transnational. Public sphere theorists and those working within its framework 
have started to ask, in other words, whether it might be possible and under what 
conditions we could start speaking of ‘transnational public spheres’.4  
 
However, the project of transposing the idea of the public sphere from its 
Westphalian origins to the transnational has not been without challenges. One 
major stumbling block is the difficulty, despite the framework’s apparent 
methodological utility5, of identifying concrete examples in which the properties 
                                                        
3 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’, trans. Thomas Burger 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms’, trans. William 
Rehg. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); N. Fraser, ‘Special section: Transnational public sphere: 
Transnationalizing the public sphere: On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-
Westphalian World’, Theory Culture & Society, 24:7 (2007), pp. 7–30. 
4 Fraser (2007); M. Castells, ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks and Global Governance’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 616 (2008), pp. 78-93; R. Higgot and E. Erman. 'Deliberative global governance and the 
question of legitimacy: what can we learn from the WTO?', Review of International Studies, 36:2 
(2010), pp. 449-470; R. Germain, ‘Financial governance and transnational deliberative 
democracy’, Review of International Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp.  493 – 509; J. Bohman, 
‘Democratising The Global Order: From Communicative Freedom to Communicative Power’,  
Review of International Studies, 36:02 (2010), pp. 431-447; Kate Nash,  (ed.) Transnationalizing 
the Public Sphere: Nancy Fraser et al, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). For an earlier discussion 
of these dynamics see also Nicholas Garnham, ‘The Media and the Public Sphere’, in Craig 
Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1992), pp. 359-376. 
5 For example a number of key studies, whilst not attempting to apply public sphere theory in a 
comprehensive way to an analysis of transnational political dynamics, have used the framework 
as a methodological reference point in their analyses of civil society, and its interactions with 
global governance. E.g. Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (London: Zed Books, 
2003); Jens Steffek and Patrizia Nanz, ‘Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global 
and European Governance’, in Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling and Patrizia Nanz (eds), Civil Society 
Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit? 
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of either nascent or existing transnational public spheres can be easily 
recognised.6 This has two important consequences. On the one hand, it renders 
those seeking to transpose public sphere theory to the transnational susceptible 
to the charge of utopianism, of promoting a political project with perhaps little or 
no chance of realisation.7 And on the other, it encourages a tendency to apply the 
theory in a partial way, modifying or suspending some of its normative content 
so as to accommodate the ‘actually possible’.8  A development that, in the eyes of 
prominent contributors to public sphere debates such as Nancy Fraser, forfeits 
the theory’s critical theoretical mission.9  
 
In this article I contribute to the public sphere theory’s transnational turn by 
doing two things. Firstly, I identify a concrete case study that provides exactly 
what seems missing from this recent scholarship: an actual example of a nascent, 
transnational public sphere. As I demonstrate, this nascent transnational public 
sphere pivots on the encounter between two important entities. On the one 
hand, a global social movement, La Vía Campesina, and on the other, a UN policy-
making body, the United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS). By 
providing a case study that demonstrates that it is possible to transnationalise 
public sphere theory in a way that doesn’t require suspension of its core 
conditions, this case study, I argue, defends both those seeking to do this from 
the charge of utopianism, and the framework itself from the notion that it can 
only be usefully applied to the transnational by surrendering some of its critical 
theoretical potential.  
 
However, this case study offers more than a defensive contribution to public 
sphere theory’s transnational turn. By delineating a field of transnational 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Global Governance, Accountability 
and Civil Society’, in  Jan Aart Scholte (ed.) Building Global Democracy: Civil Society and 
Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
6 Kate Nash for example states that  ‘At the global scale there is clearly nothing that resembles […] 
a global public sphere judged in terms of Habermas’s theory of democracy.’ Kate Nash, ‘Towards 
Transnational Democratization’, in Kate Nash,  (ed.) Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: Nancy 
Fraser et al (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), p. 66. 
7 Nash (2014) p. 61; Nick Couldry, ‘What and Where is the Transnationalized Public Sphere?’, in 
Kate Nash (ed). Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: Nancy Fraser et al. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2014), p. 44; Kenneth Baynes, ‘Nancy Fraser et al., Transnationalizing the Public Sphere, Kate 
Nash (ed.), Polity, 2014’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2015 available at 
{https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/55751-transnationalizing-the-public-sphere/} accessed 1 May 2016. 
8 Nash (2014) p. 74.  
9 Nancy Fraser, ‘Publicity, Subjection, Critique’ in Kate Nash (ed.) Transnationalizing the Public 
Sphere: Nancy Fraser et al. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). pp. 129-156.    
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relations embodying public sphere theory’s normative and empirical properties, 
the case study helps to advance this ongoing effort from a fairly abstract 
discussion over the conceptual and normative foundations of any potential 
transnational public sphere, to the development of an empirical research agenda, 
something that public sphere theory has found difficult to establish at both the 
transnational, and national levels.10 This consists of an empirical analysis of the 
degree to which the potentials I identify in this article are indeed being realised 
or not, and the second undertaking of this article is to provide an analytical 
framework to take this forward.  
 
The structure of this article is as follows. In Part 2, following this introduction I 
layout the properties of public sphere theory as I see them. This overview 
captures some key moments in the theory’s development, including the 
consequences, outlined above, of a lack of empirical examples for ongoing efforts 
to transpose the concept of public sphere to the transnational. In Part 3 I 
introduce the case study. This pivots on the relationship between two central 
elements: Firstly, an affected public – the global social movement La Vía 
Campesina - mobilising at the transnational to discursively contest transnational 
food and agricultural policy-making, at the same time as discursive contestation 
has emerged as a significant property of transnational food and agricultural 
policy-making more generally. And secondly, a transnational policy-making body 
– the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) – that recognises the formal 
right of La Vía Campesina (and other affected publics) to participate in its work, 
and by so doing promises to articulate the ‘communication flows’ emanating 
from this affected public with the aspiration for efficacious political authority at 
transnational. Drawing explicitly from the normative standards and interpretive 
concepts of public sphere theory I demonstrate how these dynamics signal the 
existence of a nascent transnational public sphere, with the CFS promising to 
provide its institutional component. In Part 4, building upon the insight that the 
case study I present in Part 3 advances the empirical research agenda of public 
sphere theory’s transnational turn, I introduce an analytical framework with 
which to take this forward. This focuses upon a longstanding concern within 
public sphere theory: the degree to which the properties of discursive arenas (in 
this instance, the CFS) empower the participation of some and disempower 
others. In the Conclusion I recapitulate the contribution of this article, and add 
some additional reflections on the critical theoretical contribution of public 
sphere theory to this case study.  
                                                        
10 Hein-Anton Van Der Heijden, Social Movements, Public Spheres and the European Politics of 
the Environment (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 200. 
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2. Public sphere theory – an overview 
 
Public sphere theory is a normative (critical) theoretical framework that directs 
analytical attention to a range of empirical dynamics, the ‘political’ significance of 
which is identified within the framework’s concern with the critical, discursive 
participation of affected publics within processes of political decision-making. 
The public sphere itself can be thought of as the ‘field of discursive relations’ - 
the spaces, arenas, and processes through which this articulation is achieved, 
and wherein some form of public, critical rationality prevails. 11 
 
In Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (hereafter: 
STPS) for example, considered the key work in public sphere theory, he argues 
for the existence of a specific, liberal bourgeois public sphere that came into 
existence in various western European states the 18th century. This emerged in 
part as a result of the extension of state regulatory authority over private affairs 
(economic activity), which meant that the exercise of such authority became a 
matter of public concern, particular amongst the newly emergent class of the 
bourgeoisie, whose critical sensibilities were being activated by new cultural 
forms.12 According to Habermas, facilitated by cultural developments such as the 
emergence of the press, coffee houses, and reading societies, the bourgeois 
public sphere sought to subject political authority to critical rational debate, 
embodying a novel, inclusive form of politics in which power gave way to the 
‘force of the better argument’.13 Unfortunately however the bourgeois public 
sphere didn’t last long, being very quickly undermined by changes in the nature 
of the state-society relationship, and the displacement of critical-rational culture 
by a culture of mere ‘consumption’.14  
 
Although critics have contested the historical accuracy and normative 
desirability of the account of the bourgeois public sphere outlined in STPS, they 
have tended to do so within a broad commitment to the standard of legitimate 
politics that it outlines. Thus, whilst many have questioned and indeed disproved 
the actual degree of inclusivity claimed by Habermas for the liberal bourgeois 
                                                        
11 Craig Calhoun, ‘Introduction’, in Craig Calhoun, (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, 
(Cambridge (MA): Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), p.37.  
12 Habermas (1989) p. 49.  
13 Habermas (1989) p. 36.  
14 Habermas (1989).  
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public sphere (which in practice was built upon the exclusion of non-white 
property owning males, such as women, the working classes, and non-whites) 
they have done so in a way that reinforces the norm that those affected by 
political decision-making ought to be able to participate in its shaping.15 And 
whilst the standard of critical-rational debate promoted by Habermas, both in 
STPS and beyond, has been critiqued for being both overly formalistic and too 
skewed towards the participatory preferences of elites, that critique has often 
been made within a commitment to the preservation of rationality and critique 
in public and political life.16   
 
Certainly, since STPS, Habermas continued to evolve his thinking within the 
context of a stable normative commitment to the importance of inclusive, 
discursive rationality in political life. One particularly important revision to his 
earlier conception of the public sphere in STPS was his incorporation of his idea 
of ‘communicative rationality’, and its closely allied concept of ‘communicative 
freedom’. These ideas are based on Habermas’s claim, ‘building on ‘speech act 
theory as proposed by J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle’ that everyday speech contains 
certain ‘validity claims’, claims to truth, sincerity, normative rightness, that are 
‘counterfactually presupposed’ in everyday interaction, but which can be 
contested, leading to their modification or displacement.17 Transposed to the 
political, this idea stresses the regulatory role of norms in political 
(administrative and legislative) decision-making, the significance of contestation 
over these norms, and indeed that ‘controversies in the broader public sphere 
primarily ignite around the normative aspects of the problems most at issue.’18 
 
                                                        
15 Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1988); Fraser (1990); Geoff Eley, ‘Nations, publics, and political 
cultures: Placing Habermas in the nineteenth century’, in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the 
Public Sphere (London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), pp. 289–339; Lisa 
McLaughlin, ‘Feminism and the political economy of transnational public space’, in Nick Crossley 
and John Michael Roberts (eds), After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); C. Calhoun, ‘The Public Sphere in the Field of Power’, Social 
Science History, 34:3 (2010), pp. 301-335. 
16 S. D. Stryker, ‘Communicative Action in History’, European Journal of Social Theory, 3:2 (2000), 
pp. 215-234; Nick Crossley, ‘On Systematically distorted communication: Bourdieu and  
the Socio-Analysis of Publics’, in Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (eds) After Habermas: 
New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).   
17 T. Risse. ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization 
54:1 (2000), pp. 9-10; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication Action: Reason and 
Rationalization of Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Habermas (1996) p. 4.  
18 Habermas (1996), p. 357.  
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Public sphere theory then is the site of ongoing revision and contestation, within 
an overarching normative commitment to some key positions. Along with 
Habermas’s substantial developments, undertaken in dialogue and debate with 
his critics, these revisions have introduced powerful new ideas to the overall 
framework of public sphere theory.19 
 
Perhaps the most significant of recent developments in public sphere theory is 
its shift to the transnational. The context for this is provided by the undermining 
of the Westphalian state as the locus of democratic participation by the 
emergence of transnational governance and policy issues. The lack of meaningful 
participation opportunities for affected publics in such transnational governance 
processes is regarded as equally problematic. Thus the idea of a ‘transnational 
public sphere’ has become a referent for a range of scholars who, in different 
ways, have sought to interrogate the possibilities for ordinary citizens to 
discursively influence policy-making and governance activities at the 
transnational. Such scholars have focused upon: the role and limits of the media 
and internet in contributing to the realisation of a transnational public sphere;20 
the question of where might we turn to locate the discursive arenas capable of 
hosting processes of transnational public opinion formation;21 how to generate 
or establish the shared ideational or cultural resources through which a 
transnational public might be meaningfully realised22; whom ought to be 
regarded as the protagonists within the transnational public sphere and by what 
principles of inclusion do we recognise them;23 and how might transnational 
institutions and processes of policy-making and governance be transformed so 
that they can fulfil the institutional requirements of the public sphere.24  
 
The project of transposing public sphere theory from its Westphalian origins to a 
transnational frame, however, has been challenged by the lack of empirical 
                                                        
19 John Michael Roberts and Nick Crossley, ‘Introduction’, in Crossley and Roberts (2004).  
20 McLaughlin (2004); Fraser (2007); Castells (2008); Couldry (2014); B. Cammaerts and L. Van 
Audenhove, L. ‘Online Political Debate, Unbounded Citizenship, and the Problematic Nature of a 
Transnational Public Sphere', Political communication, 22: 2 (2005), pp.147-162. 
21 Fraser (2007); J. Conway and J. Singh, ‘Is the World Social Forum a Transnational Public 
Sphere?: Nancy Fraser, Critical Theory and the Containment of Radical Possibility’, Theory, 
Culture & Society, 26:5 (2009), pp. 61-84.  
22 Fraser (2007); Bohman (2010). 
23 Fraser, ‘On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world’; Fraser, 
‘Publicity, subjection, critique: a reply to my critics’; Higgot and Erman, ‘Deliberative global 
governance and the question of legitimacy’; Nash, ‘Towards transnational democratization?’..   
24 Fraser (2007); Germain (2010); Bohman (2010).  
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examples in which the properties of any such transnationally located public 
sphere could be easily identified. This lack of empirical examples has two 
important consequences. Firstly, it leaves those advocating the public sphere as a 
viable frame for organising democratic politics at the transnational susceptible 
to the charge of utopianism. This is the view that questions whether the gap 
between the Habermasian conception of the public sphere and the realities of 
transnational politics is too great for its transposition to the transnational to be 
viable or even useful.25 Whilst broadly accepting the democratic challenge posed 
by the emergence of the transnational as both a site and object of governance 
activity, those holding this view propose that it would be more plausible and 
beneficial instead to shift the gaze of inquiry back down to the national level (to 
explore the transnationalisation of domestic public spheres), or, to suspend 
some of public sphere theory’s normative conditions in an attempt to locate 
democratic potential within the ‘actually possible’.26  However, the problem here, 
comes the response, is that this very seriously undermines public sphere 
theory’s critical-theoretical potential.27  This refers to its value as a normative 
reference from which to evaluate and, indeed, transform the world.28 Thus public 
sphere theory’s transnational turn seems to have come to something of a fork in 
the road, confronted with the dangers of utopianism, on one side, or a loss of 
critical theoretical potential on the other. Recent developments in the field of 
transnational food and agricultural policy-making demonstrate however that it is 
possible to apply public sphere theory to the transnational in a way that is 
neither utopian, nor that diminishes the framework’s critical theoretical 
potential.  
 
3. Affected publics and institutional possibilities in the nascent 
transnational public sphere  
 
i. Contestion and institutional fragmentation in transnational food and 
agricultural policy-making 
 
                                                        
25 Nash (2014); Couldry (2014). 
26 Nash (2014) p 74; Couldry (2014). 
27 Fraser, ‘Publicity, subjection, critique: a reply to my critics’. 
28 Nash (2014) p. 60; Angela Crack, Global Communication and Transnational Public Spheres 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) p.197. 
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Contemporary food and agricultural policy-making is an intensely contested 
field. By this I mean that a wide range of actors, in a wide range of locations, 
compete to shape both the ends of food policy-making and the means by which 
these ends are attained. One way of tracking this contestation is through 
historical accounts provided by food policy scholars of the post-war evolution of 
food and agricultural policy. Typically, these accounts are divided into three to 
four key periods that chart the transition from a post-war productionist 
‘consensus’, through an era of neoliberalism, to the present day when food and 
agricultural policy is taxed by a wide range of issues and challenges (e.g. poverty 
reduction, human rights, ecological sustainability, biodiversity management) but 
there exists little agreement on how to address them. This means that the 
‘optimism’ of the early post-war period has given way, via ‘confusion’, to a 
situation of ‘competing and contested policy options’.29 Indeed, invoking a 
resonance with Habermas’s thinking on the public sphere30, these new issues or 
‘fundamentals’31, it is argued, breach conventional or ‘accepted’ frameworks for 
thinking about food policy (e.g., food security, and productivist or narrowly 
economistic approaches), necessitating in their place a new normativity for food 
and agricultural policy-making, variously conceived as ‘ecological public health’32 
or the ‘food policy new’.33 
 
The competition over the direction of food policy is signaled from another 
quarter by the growing emphasis given to the attainment of ‘discursive power’ 
by some of the most powerful actors in the food system: Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs). This speaks to their growing attempts to augment the 
‘structural’ and ‘instrumental’ influence that they exert over food policy by 
participating within and shaping its discursive formulation.34 Such behavior is 
evidenced, for example, in initiatives undertaken by agribusiness TNCs through 
                                                        
29 Tim Lang, David Barling and Martin Caraher, Food Policy: Integrating Health, Environment and 
Society,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 42-44. 
30 By capturing the degree to which contestation over norms has become a key feature of 
contemporary food and agricultural policy-making.  
31 T. Lang, ‘Crisis? What Crisis? The Normality of the Current Food Crisis’, Journal of Agrarian 
Change, 10:1 (2010), pp. 87-97 
32 D. Barling, T. Lang, and M. Caraher, ‘Joined Up Food Policy? The Trials of Governance, Public 
Policy and the Food System’, Social Policy and Administration, 36:6 (2002), pp. 556-574; Lang et 
al. (2009). 
33 S. Maxwell, and R. Slater, ‘Food Policy Old and New’, Development Policy Review, 21:5/6 
(2003), pp. 531-553.  
34 Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs, ‘Agri-food corporations, global governance, and sustainability: 
A framework for analysis’ in Jennifer Claps and Doris Fuchs (eds), Corporate Power in Agri-food 
Governance, (London: The MIT Press, 2009), pp. 8-10.  
 11 
the World Economic Forum (WEF), including the publication of the report 
Realizing a New Vision for Agriculture: A Roadmap for Stakeholders and the 
convening of the Global Agenda Council on Food Security (GACFS).35  The GACFS 
was founded in 2008, when the World Economic Forum created the Network of 
Global Agenda Councils, each of which focuses ‘on the foremost topics in the 
global arena’, and seeks to convene ‘relevant thought leaders from academia, 
government, business and other fields’. The policy orientation of the CACFS is 
made explicit in its stated intent ‘to capture the best [pro-market] knowledge on 
each key issue and integrate it into global collaboration and decision-making 
processes.’36  
 
To a significant extent the emergence of the global social movement La Vía 
Campesina is both illustrative and constitutive of the contestation in 21st century 
transnational food policy-making. La Vía Campesina was launched in October 
1993, and in its own words brings together ‘peasants, small and medium-size 
farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants and 
agricultural workers’ to defend small-scale sustainable agriculture and promote 
‘social justice and dignity’.37 It has membership in over 80 countries, and counts 
over 200 million small-scale and peasant food producers amongst its ranks. 
Supported by ‘exchanges and dialogue’ between farming organisations in 
different regions in preceding decades, the emergence of La Vía Campesina 
reflects the development of a collective awareness amongst farming peoples 
North and South that despite their diverse locations, many of the challenges they 
faced (adverse political and market conditions) were shared. These challenges 
were from their perspective the result of a transnationalised neoliberalism and 
modernisation agenda, which the imminent establishment of the World Trade 
                                                        
35 The initiative Realizing a New Vision for Agriculture: A Roadmap for Stakeholders was 
‘championed’ by 17 agribusiness TNCs with massive market presences in seeds, food retail, 
fertilizers, and processing sectors: Archer Daniel Midlands, BASF, Bunge, Cargill, The Coca-Cola 
Company, DuPont, General Mills, Kraft Foods, Metro, Monsanto Company, Nestlé, PepsiCo, 
SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, Wal-Mart Stores, and Yara International. WEF (World Economic 
Forum), ‘Realizing a New Vision for Agriculture: A Roadmap for Stakeholders’, (2010), p.3.   
available at: {http://www.weforum.org/reports/realizing-new-vision-agriculture-roadmap-
stakeholders} accessed 1 August 2011. 
36  WEF (World Economic Forum), ‘Global Agenda Councils’ WEF Website, available at: 
{http://www.weforum.org/community/global-agenda- councils} accessed 9 November 2011.  
37 La Vía Campesina, ‘What is La Vía Campesina?’ La Vía Campesina Website, available at: 
{http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44/what-is-la-via-
campesinamainmenu-45} accessed 17 November 2013. 
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Organisation threatened to extend even further. Thus farming peoples in North 
and South recognised the need for a global presence to contest these dynamics.38 
 
According to its intellectuals, the main purpose of La Vía Campesina therefore is 
to be the ‘voice’ of ‘the peasant movement’ in the ‘global debates on agrarian 
policy’.39  In order to achieve this goal La Vía Campesina, often in conjunction 
with its allies such as those within the International Planning Committee for 
Food Sovereignty (IPC)40 and beyond, undertakes a number of different types of 
activities. These include mobilisations and demonstrations before the meetings 
of international food and agriculturally relevant bodies, such as the WTO; 
speaking at the podium in meetings of United Nations (UN) bodies, such as the 
General Assembly, or the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN; and 
convening autonomous spaces of civil society deliberation. Amongst this last 
group of activities we can count the movement’s four to five yearly International 
Conferences, the most recent of which was held 9-13th June 2013, in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, which are attended by hundred of delegates representing small-scale, 
peasant- and family-farmers arriving from most regions of the world. And also 
important in this regard are the movement’s collaborations with its allies, 
                                                        
38 Annette Desmarais, La Vía Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2007); M.E. Martínez-Torres and P. M. Rosset, ‘La Vía Campesina: The Birth and Evolution 
of a Transnational Social Movement’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 37:1 (2010), pp. 149-175; A. 
Desmarais, and P. Nicholson, ‘La Vía Campesina: An Historical and Political Analysis’, in La Vía 
Campesina, La Vía Campesina's Open Book: Celebrating 20 Years of Struggle and Hope, La Vía 
Campesina Website (2013), available at: {http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/publications-
mainmenu-30/1409-la-via-campesina-s-open-book-celebrating-20-years-of-struggle-and-hope} 
accessed on 2 February 2015.  
39 Paul Nicholson, Basque farmer, founding member of La Vía Campesina and four-term member 
of its International Coordinating Committee, quoted in Desmarais (2007) p.77. Though of course 
the ‘meanings’ of La Vía Campesina are many and varied, and extend beyond this particular 
orientation to include, amongst others, constituting an arena of encounter for rural peoples 
around the world from diverse cultures and world visions, and providing a solidarity network for 
anti-systemic and reformist struggles the world over (Desmarais (2007); Martínez-Torres and 
Rosset (2010); Desmarais and Nicholson (2013).  
40 The IPC is a transnational civil society network working on a food sovereignty platform and 
committed to the political protagonism of food producer and other rural and food insecure social 
movements. For an overview see Nora McKeon, The UN and Civil Society, (London: Zed Books, 
2009a). For discussion of the IPC’s engagement within the CFS see also Nora McKeon, Food 
Security Governance: Empowering Communities, Regulating Corporations, (London: Routledge, 
2015), and L. Colombo and A. Onorati, Food. Riots and Rights, IIED, FIRAB, and Crocevia (2013) 
available at:  
{www.firab.it/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/foodrights_aw.pdf} accessed on 1 Jan 2015. 
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through for example providing logistical and personnel support, in the creation 
of international civil society fora and meetings. These include the Nyéléni 2007 – 
Forum for food sovereignty, held 23–27 February 2007 in Sélingué, Mali, and the 
People’s food sovereignty civil society forum, held in Rome, Italy, 13–17 November 
2009, the later of these two events being timed to coincide with the World Food 
Summit held at the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) at the same time.41 
 
La Vía Campesina then is internationally active in a range of different ways in 
seeking to create spaces for autonomous civil society deliberation and channel 
the outcomes of those deliberations into international policy arenas. As we shall 
see, increasingly this activity takes the form of extended participation in formal 
policy processes. The framework for La Vía Campesina’s deliberations and 
interventions is provided by the ‘food sovereignty’ framework, defined as ‘the 
right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and agriculture 
systems.’42 Food sovereignty has been variously described as, a call, a concept, a 
vision a slogan, a policy framework, a manifesto, and a political project.43 The 
primary sense is which I want to present it here however is as a policy-oriented, 
discursive intervention affirming the ends that food and agricultural policy-
making and governance should be pursuing, and the means through which those 
ends ought to be attained. In terms of ends, for example, food sovereignty asserts 
the importance of food and agriculture for expressing cultural identity, fostering 
health, securing the political autonomy of communities and nations, and 
                                                        
41 The aspirations of the Forum organisers to create an autonomous discursive arena through 
which to try to influence transnational food policy-making is captured very clearly in the 
invitation letter that went out to delegates, and which stated their intention for the Forum to be 
‘an autonomous and self-organized space which aims at debating and articulating processes and 
proposals on Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Policies as an input to the action of the social 
movements and to the Intergovernmental Summit.’ International Steering Committee for the 
People’s Food Sovereignty Forum, ‘Invitation Letter to the People’s Forum for Food Sovereignty 
2009: Social Movements/NGOs/CSOs Parallel Event to the World Food Summit on Food  
Security’, (Hard copy acquired by the author during the forum, 2009). 
42 La Vía Campesina (2013).  
43 Michel Pimbert,  ‘Towards Food Sovereignty’,  (London: IIED, 2009); R. Patel, ‘Food 
Sovereignty’, Journal of Peasant Studies 36:3, (2009), pp. 663–706; Martínez-Torres, and Rosset, 
(2010); Hannah Wittman, Annette Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, ‘The Origins and Potential of 
Food Sovereignty’, in Hannah Wittman, Annette Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe (eds), Food 
Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community, (Oakland, CA: Food First Book, 2010); 
H. Bernstein, ‘Food Sovereignty: A Skeptical View’, Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue, 
International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands, 24th January 2014. 
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preserving the environment. In order to secure those ends food sovereignty 
contemplates a range of different practices and interventions (e.g. inclusive food 
decision-making; locally oriented, agroecological food production; state support 
for both) and has specific things to say about the rights to be enjoyed and duties 
owed by different food system actors. Thus, peoples have the right to participate 
in food policy-making, peasants have the right to be protected by human rights 
instruments, and governments have the responsibility to manage the food 
system. TNCs, on the other hand, do not have the right to appropriate control of 
natural resources, or to impose genetically modified organisms (GMOs) upon 
either farmers or consumers.44 
 
Seen as an intervention into the ‘global agrarian debate’, therefore, food 
sovereignty implicitly contests many of the assumptions and conclusions present 
within more institutionally sanctioned policy framings, such as the food security 
framework, or the economistic approaches adopted by the World Bank and other 
institutional actors. These often reduce food and agriculture to a purely 
economic function, enabling an apparently unproblematic comparison between 
farming, on the one hand, and ‘off farm employment’ and ‘urban jobs’ (i.e. 
working in a factory), on the other.45 Food sovereignty then implicitly and 
explicitly contests the normative frameworks within which food policy-making is 
situated, seeking to valorise the specificity of food and agriculture by expanding 
recognition of the range of ends that food and agriculture needs to serve.46  
                                                        
44 For important analyses of La Vía Campesina’s development of innovative rights and 
responsibilities frameworks see H. Wittman, ‘Reworking the metabolic rift: La Vía Campesina, 
Agrarian Citizenship and Food Sovereignty’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36: 4 (2009), pp. 805-
826; H. Wittman, ‘Reframing Agrarian citizenship: Land, life and Power in Brazil’, Journal of Rural 
Studies, 25:1 (2009), pp.120 – 130; P. Claeys, ‘From Food Sovereignty to Peasants' Rights: an 
Overview of Via Campesina's Struggle for New Human Rights', in La Vía Campesina, La Vía  
Campesina's Open Book, (2013) available at:  
{http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/publications-mainmenu-30/1409-la-via-campesina-s-
open-book-celebrating-20-years-of-struggle-and-hope} accessed 28 January 2015; and P. Claeys, 
‘The Creation of New Rights by the Food Sovereignty Movement: The Challenge of 
Institutionalizing Subversion', Sociology, 46:5 (2012), pp. 844-860. 
45 Cf. World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development’, (Washington: 
World Bank, 2007); C. Peter Timmer, ‘Food Policy in the Era of Supermarkets: What’s different?’, 
in Ellen B. McCullough, Prabhu L. Pingali, P.B. and Kostas G. Stamoulis, (eds.), ‘The 
Transformation of Agri-food Systems: Globalization, Supply Chains and Smallholder Farmers 
(London: Earthscan, 2008), p. 81. 
46 The publication of the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) in 2009 also communicates the contested nature of 21st century food and 
agricultural policy-making. Recognising that agriculture faced many urgent social and economic 
problems, IAASTD underscored that ‘business as usual’ was not an option and was the first global 
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Indeed, in the emergence and activities of La Vía Campesina we can discern many 
of the attributes that are associated with the existence of public spheres. Firstly, 
we have an affected public, smallscale food producers, who have mobilised from 
the grassroots upwards (or the periphery inwards) seeking to participate in the 
‘global debates on agrarian policy’, precisely at the same time as discursive 
contestation has become a feature of transnational food and agricultural policy-
making more generally.47 An important part of this mobilisation involves the 
creation of autonomous discursive arenas, including the movement itself, the 
purpose of which is to enable deliberation and encounter amongst groups for 
whom collective deliberation opportunities would otherwise not be forthcoming. 
This aspiration has led to La Vía Campesina being conceptualised as a ‘new 
citizenship’ space.48 It is also apparent that the movement and its arenas embody 
the attributes of a ‘subaltern counterpublic’, defined by Fraser as ‘parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and 
circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.’49  
 
The ‘counterdiscourse’ here is of course food sovereignty, the emergence of 
which is emblematic of a second key attribute associated with public spheres: 
                                                                                                                                                              
level assessment to recognised the virtues of the type of smallscale agriculture promoted within 
food sovereignty. The result of an intergovernmental, multi-agency cooperation involving 
institutions such as the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, and the United Nations Environmental Programme, the IAASTD report communicated 
that even at the institutional core of international food and agricultural coordination, radical 
departures from mainstream thinking were possible. Pimbert (2008), p. 4-5. See also: 
International Assessment of Agricultural Science, Technology and Development, ‘Agriculture at a 
crossroads: Synthesis report, 2009’ available at  
{http://www.agassessment.org/reports/iaastd/en/agriculture%20at%20a%20crossroads_ 
synthesis%20report%20(english).pdf} accessed 4 June 2010. 
47 Whilst certainly the largest and drawing membership from the widest geographical spread, La 
Vía Campesina is not the only transnationally active agrarian social movement. Others – also 
present in the Committee on World Food Security - include, from Central Africa the Plate forme 
Sous Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique Centrale (PROPAC), from West Africa the 
Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA); and from 
Asia the Asian Peasants Coalition (APC). For an overview see S. M. Borras Jr, M. Edelman, and C. 
Kay, ‘Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 
8:2/3 (2008), pp.169-204. 
48 Saturnino M. Borras Jr. and Jennifer C. Franco, ‘Transnational Agrarian Movements struggling 
for land and citizenship rights’, IDS Working Paper, 323, (Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies, 2009), p. 38.  
49 Fraser (1990) p. 67.  
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competition over the normative direction of political decision-making. Recalling 
Habermas’s assertion that ‘controversies in the broader public sphere primarily 
ignite around the normative aspects of the problems most at issue’50 and both 
food sovereignty’s implicit and explicit contestation of the normative basis of 
food and agricultural policy-making, and its articulation by an affected public at 
the periphery suggest a nascent transnational public sphere being provoked, and 
indeed, constituted, by La Vía Campesina, and others. 
 
The recognition that La Vía Campesina can be regarded as a constitutional 
element of a nascent transnational public sphere should perhaps come as no 
surprise, considering the role that social movements have played historically in 
terms of expanding both the range of issues under discussion within ‘official’ 
public spheres, and the number of those participating in their discussion.51 The 
transnational mobilisation of La Vía Campesina, therefore, and the various types 
of activities the movement undertakes can be seen as an extension to the 
transnational of the historic role undertaken by social movements within 
national public spheres.52  
 
However, it is important to note that the aspiration to create a public sphere 
alone is not evidence that one actually does or could exist, particularly when we 
recall Fraser’s insistence that the articulation of the discursive arenas of the 
public sphere with political authority is absolutely central to its ‘critical force and 
political point’.53 In STPS, for instance, Habermas argues that a key stage in the 
development of the bourgeois public sphere, at least in the UK context, was the 
transformation of the medieval assembly of estates into a modern parliament 
capable of and willing to respond to the newly emergent discursive arenas of the 
bourgeois. Indeed, it was through this process of linking that the public sphere 
was finally able to fulfill its political function as ‘an organ for the self-articulation 
of civil society with state authority corresponding to its needs.’54 In Between 
Facts and Norms, within which Habermas shifted from the historical analysis of 
STPS to present the public sphere as part of an overall ‘methodological fiction’,55 
Habermas sees the articulation of the wider public sphere of the ‘informal public’ 
                                                        
50 Habermas (1996) p. 357. 
51 Calhoun (1992) p. 37; Eley, ‘Nations, publics, and political cultures’; Moishe Postone, ‘Political 
Theory and Historical Analysis’,  in Craig Calhoun, (ed.) (1992); Calhoun (2010) p. 2013. 
52  Social movements such as La Vía Campesina, therefore, are not just participants within, but are 
actually constitutive of the transnational public sphere (cf. Castells, 2008). 
53 Fraser (2007) p. 8.  
54 Habermas (1989) p. 74.  
55 Habermas (1996) p. 326.  
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with the ‘formal public’ of institutionalized decision-making as occurring, at least 
in part, via: 
 
[C]ommunication flows that start at the periphery and pass through the 
sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures situated at the entrance to 
the parliamentary complex or the courts (and, if necessary, at the exit of the 
implementing administration as well).56  
 
As we might expect, given the development of transnational institutions and 
governance processes outside of anything resembling ‘citizen engagement’, we 
can find very few examples of mechanisms and processes that exist to 
systematically articulate the working of these institutions and processes with 
‘communication flows’ emanating from wider publics.57 Those working explicitly 
within the framework of transnational public sphere theory, therefore, have both 
invoked the need for, and examined, potential mechanisms and principles of 
articulation to remedy this.58 It is important to note, moreover, that to fulfil the 
political authority component of the public sphere, such institutions or ‘public 
powers’ need to do more than simply articulate with wider, affected publics. 
They also have to translate that communicative interaction into ‘binding laws 
and then into administrative power’, on the one hand, and possess the capacity 
to regulate against the violation, and towards the realisation, of this public’s 
aspirations, on the other.59 
 
In the specific domain of food and agriculture, however, the possibility of 
articulating discursive arenas, such as those being constituted by La Vía 
Campesina and their allies, with authoritative policy-making and governance at 
the transnational is complicated by the fragmentation that exists therein.60 For 
                                                        
56 Habermas (1996) p. 356, referencing Bernhard Peters, Die Integration Moderner 
Gesellschaften, (Frankfurt am Main, 1993).   
57 For instance, Scholte observes that ‘the contemporary growth in influence of global governance 
processes has not been accompanied by a corresponding development of formal accountability 
mechanisms which link these agencies directly to the publics they affect.’ (Scholte, 2011: 25). See 
also: McKeon (2009a).  
58 Nanz and Steffek (2004); Fraser (2007); Bohman (2010). 
59 What Fraser has called the ‘efficacy condition’ (2007) p. 23.  
60 Jessica Duncan, Global Food Security Governance: Civil Society Engagement in the Reformed 
Committee on World Food Security, (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 9; Matias E. Margulis. ‘Global 
Food Security Governance: The Committee on World Food Security, Comprehensive Framework 
for Action and the G8/G20’, in: Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.) The Challenge of Food Security: 
International Policy and Regulatory Frameworks (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar: 2010), p. 232. 
McKeon (2015) p. 204.  
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example, when in 1990 the no longer existing World Food Council surveyed UN 
agencies working on hunger and malnourishment issues, it identified ‘well over 
30 multilateral institutions’ at work in this area.61 More recently, the 20 bodies 
participating in the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Task Force (HLTF) 
convened in respond to the 2007/2008 ‘food price crisis’, and the importance 
given to the need for ‘coordination’ in the post-food price crisis agenda, again, 
underscores the fragmentation that exists in this domain.62 
 
These headline facts communicate that the articulation of affected publics with 
authoritative transnational food and agricultural policy-making is not a simple 
matter. Multiple entities, addressing different issues (e.g. trade, food aid, 
agricultural finance, nutrition, development, food safety) coupled with other 
transnationalised dynamics with regulatory effects on local and national food 
systems (e.g. investment flows, private standard-setting/retail standards, 
philanthropic/donor initiatives) present both countries and non-state actors 
alike seeking to engage with and influence these processes with a disorienting 
array of options and demands. Of course, the challenges posed by this terrain 
weigh disproportionately upon the resource poor, which leaves richer actors 
enjoying the advantage of being able to ‘shift the debate across a range of policy-
making arenas’.63 Indeed, La Vía Campesina have themselves keenly felt the 
sharp edge of this challenge, and the attainment therefore of a single, 
authoritative food and agricultural arena at the global level, so as to enable their 
effective participation, has been a strategic priority for them for some years.64 
The reform of the UN Committee on World Food Security in 2009 has arguably 
made a fundamentally important step towards that goal. 
 
                                                        
61 D. John Shaw, World food security: A history since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2007) p.206.  
62 See, for example: UNGA (United Nations General Assembly), ‘Draft Resolution Referred to the 
High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its Sixty-Forth 
Session: Keeping the promise: United to achieve the Millennium Development Goals’, United 
Nations General Assembly, Sixty Fifth Session, 17th October 2010, available at: 
{www.un.org/en/.../ZeroDraft OutcomeDocument_31May2010rev2.pdf} accessed 15 September 
2011; EU-US Transatlantic Development Dialogue, ‘Road map for cooperation in food security’, 
available at: {ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/.../eu_us_roadmap_food_security_en.pdf} 
accessed 15 September 2011; G20, ‘The G20 Seoul summit leaders’ declaration, November 11–
12, 2010’, available at: {www.g20.org/ Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf 
accessed 15 September 2011. 
63 Lang et al. (2009) p. 87. 
64 J. Brem-Wilson,   ‘Towards Food Sovereignty: Interrogating Peasant Voice in the UN Committee 
on World Food Security’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 42:1 (2015),  p. 8. 
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ii. The reformed UN Committee on World Food Security 
 
The UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was established in 1974 at the 
World Food Conference, and tasked with the responsibility of monitoring the 
hunger elimination commitments that governments made there. Whatever its 
track record in between, by the mid-2000s the CFS enjoyed something of a 
precarious status, and some envisaging its winding down, or at least, a significant 
reduction in its work load,65 and some commentators even questioning whether 
the UN had any role to play in food security efforts more generally.66 However, in 
October 2009 the CFS emerged from a relatively quick (six month) negotiation 
process with a blueprint for its reform that emphatically affirmed its status in the 
international food and agricultural institutional architecture, and outlined an 
organisational structure that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon subsequently 
hailed as a ‘model of multistakeholder governance – an example for all’.67  
 
The catalyst for this transformation was the 2007-2008 ‘food price crisis’. 
Involving food riots and social unrest in over 30 countries in response to sharp, 
sudden rises in the international prices of some key food staples (which made 
them inaccessible to certain populations). This event had the effect of propelling 
food security significantly up the agenda of global elites such as the G8, the G20, 
and the senior bureaucracy of the UN. As well as seizing the agenda of an 
international summit68, and a raft of new funding pledges, one important 
consequence of this increased attention was the transformation of a simmering 
discontent with the performance of the international food security institutional 
architecture into a concrete process of reform. This led via a set of highly 
favourable circumstances to the revisioning of the CFS from a fairly irrelevant 
body at the margins of the UN system, to one that now aspired to be the ‘central 
                                                        
65 IEE (Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations), ‘FAO: The Challenge of Renewal: Report of the Independent External Evaluation of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)’ 2009 www.fao.org/unfao/ 
bodies/IEE-Working-Draft-Report/K0489E.pdf (accessed October 20, 2008), p. 178. 
66 E. Clay, ‘Book Review: The UN and Global Food Security’, Development Policy Review, 26: 2 
(2008), p. 248.  
67 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Secretary General Address to the 37th Committee on World Food Security’, 
YouTube, available at: {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ycTZmuAeb4}, accessed 19 May 
2015.  
68 The High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and 
Bioenergy, 3rd to the 5th of June, 2008, The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, Rome.  
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United Nations political platform dealing with food security and nutrition’.69 
Three properties of the reformed CFS are particularly relevant. 
 
The first feature of note in the reformed CFS is its inclusivity. The CFS is an 
intergovernmental committee. It was created by states, and states, 
predominantly via their diplomatic representation at the CFS’s host institution, 
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), are its 
principle actor. However, in part as a response to the number of different 
transnationally and otherwise located entities and actors who are relevant to 
food and agricultural policy-making, the CFS now extends formal participation 
rights, excluding decision-making authority reserved for states alone, to a wide 
range of actors. These include representatives of International Financial 
Institutions, such as the World Bank; representatives of agricultural research 
centres; those from the private sector; and representatives of other UN bodies 
with a specific mandate in food and agriculture. Crucially, the CFS now also 
aspires to meaningfully include those ‘most affected by food security’, and 
identifies 11 civil society constituencies whose inclusion in its work should be a 
matter of ‘particular attention’. 70  These are: ‘smallholder family farmers, 
artisanal fisherfolk, herders/pastoralists, landless, urban poor, agricultural and 
food workers, women, youth, consumers, Indigenous Peoples, and International 
NGOs whose mandates and activities are concentrated in the areas of concern to 
the Committee’. 71  The extension of formal participation rights in an 
intergovernmental committee to representatives of small-scale food producers 
and other marginalised constituencies is, of course, ‘unprecedented’ in the 
history of UN-civil society relations.72  
 
The second feature of note is the CFS’s aspirations to become a site of policy 
debate. This aspiration is signalled within its reform blueprint both implicitly 
and explicitly. Implicitly, it follows from the focus of the CFS expressed via its 
roles upon promoting global level policy coherence and coordination.73 Given 
both the current state of food and agricultural policy-making, characterised by 
‘competing and contested policy options’74  and the range of actors now 
                                                        
69 CFS (Committee on World Food Security), ‘Reform of the Committee on World Security: Final 
version, October 2009’, available at: {http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/cfs/cfs35/index_ 
en.htm} accessed 19 December 2011), Paragraph 2.  
70 CFS (2009), Paragraph 11.ii.  
71 CFS (2009), Paragraph 11.ii. 
72 McKeon (2015) p. 107.  
73 CFS (2009) Paragraphs 5 i. ii. and iii.  
74 Lang et al. (2009) pp. 42-44.  
 21 
permitted to participate in the CFS’s work, it is to be expected that this journey 
towards coherence and coordination would be attended by no small measure of 
debate and contestation. Indeed, the reform blueprint communicates as much, 
and explicitly recognises the role of the CFS as a site of inclusive, global level 
policy debate.75 
 
And finally, the last key feature to note about the reformed CFS is its aspiration 
for political centrality. As noted, prior to its reform some observers assigned the 
CFS a precarious status. Indeed, in the context of the post-2007-2008 food price 
crisis and the concern this provoked amongst policy elites with reform of the 
international food security institutional architecture, there was an apparent 
attempt by some powerful states to shift the locus of international food security 
coordination from Rome (home of the FAO, the CFS, and three other UN entities 
with mandates in food and agriculture) to Washington, D.C., home of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the International Food Policy Research Institute.76 This 
possibility never materialised, however, and following its reform the CFS 
declared itself to be: [T]he central United Nations political platform dealing with 
food security and nutrition…’.77  An aspiration that, in part, is why legal scholar 
and former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter has 
argued that the reformed CFS represents ‘an innovative way to overcome the 
challenge of fragmentation in international law’.78 
 
Following its reform the UN Committee on World Food Security now manifests 
three important aspirations: to be inclusive, to be a site of policy debate, and to 
be politically central. It therefore promises to embody many of the properties 
sought by La Vía Campesina in the global governance of food and agriculture. 
This is not an accident, and reflects to some extent the high degree of influence 
that La Vía Campesina and their allies in the International Planning Committee 
                                                        
75  ‘The Plenary is the central body for decision-taking, debate, coordination, lesson-learning and 
convergence by all stakeholders at global level on issues pertaining to food security and nutrition 
CFS’ (2009) Paragraph 20, emphasis added.  
76 Josh Brem-Wilson, ‘La Vía Campesina and the UN Committee on World Food Security: A 
Transnational Public Sphere?’, PhD Thesis, 2012, available at:  
{https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/5706/Jbremwilson_FINAL_PhDThesi
s.pdf?sequence=1}, p. 217.  
77 CFS (2009) Paragraph 2.  
78 O. De Schutter, ‘The Reform of the Committee on World Food Security: The Quest for 
Coherence in Global Governance’, CRIDHO Working Paper 2013/8, available at: 
{http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/CRIDHO-WP-2013-8-ODeSchutter-
CFS-GolbalGovernance.pdf} accessed 23 February 2015, p. 5. 
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for Food Sovereignty (IPS) were able enjoy during the process of negotiating the 
vision for the CFS’s reform. The opening for them in this process came in part as 
a result of many years investment of time and energy cultivating a presence 
before FAO (the CFS’s host institution) and other Rome-based food entities such 
as the International Fund for Agricultural Development. When the IPC was 
formally invited to participate in the CFS reform discussions, this gave La Vía 
Campesina an opportunity to initially observe, but then become more active in 
the reform discussions as the process continued. To key La Vía Campesina 
personnel participating throughout its final stages, both the level of participation 
they enjoyed in the CFS reform process, and their influence over its outcome 
greatly exceeded their expectations at that time.79 And following the adoption of 
the reform blueprint in October 2009 La Vía Campesina has continued to invest a 
high level of participation in the reformed CFS, being an active participant both 
in its intersessional work, and its annual plenary.80  
 
The presence of La Vía Campesina, and other transnational social movement 
actors81 in the its meetings and work means that the CFS promises to include 
smallscale food producers and other rural peoples in a policy arena that aspires 
for political centrality and in which the contested nature of contemporary food 
policy is implicitly and explicitly recognised. It promises, in other words, to 
articulate the ‘communication flows’ emanating from an affected public and its 
allies’ subaltern counterpublics, with transnational public authority, and by so 
doing provide the institutional component of a transnational public sphere.  The 
vehicle of that articulation is of course their direct participation, underpinned by 
a formal right of inclusion in the CFS’s work.  
 
There is of course a key distinction to be drawn between the promise contained 
in a text (the CFS reform blueprint) and the delivery of that promise in practice 
(the actual functioning of the CFS). To fulfil the institutional criteria of a 
transnational public sphere the CFS must deliver on its three key dimensions 
                                                        
79 For a more comprehensive description of the CFS reform process and its immediate context 
see Brem-Wilson (2015) pp. 5-7, and Brem-Wilson (2012) pp. 203-222. 
80 For example, for the period 2015-2017 La Vía Campesina is one of six organisations 
representing civil society in the CFS’s Advisory Group, and holds two of the four available slots 
available to representatives of smallholder farmers in the Coordination Committee of the Civil 
Society Mechanism. They also constitute one the largest civil society delegations at the annual 
plenary.  
81 E.g., from Central Africa the Plate forme Sous Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique 
Centrale (PROPAC), from West Africa the Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA); and from Asia the Asian Peasants Coalition (APC). 
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simultaneously. It must become meaningfully: politically central, a site of policy 
debate, and inclusive. To be sure, none of these goals looked like it was ever 
going to come easy, and recent studies covering the post-reform period indicate 
that mixed progress is visible within each area.  
 
For example, in terms of its aspirations for political centrality, various dynamics 
communicate that the CFS has undoubtedly established itself as a key forum for 
food security discussion at the global level. These include increased participation 
in its work by key states and regions, the private sector and International 
Financial Institutions such as the World Bank. They also include discursive 
recognition, at least, of the role of the CFS as a key site of global food security 
coordination from other global policy fora, including the UN General Assembly, 
the G20, G8, and UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).82 
Perhaps more importantly, there is now clear evidence that CFS policy 
instruments are influencing the behaviour of both state and non-state actors. The 
‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security’ provide probably 
the best illustration of this. Adopted by the CFS in 2012, the Guidelines are 
already showing signs of impacting national legislative processes, have been 
recognised by the UK govt, for example, as providing a ‘globally agreed standard’ 
for land governance, and appear to be influencing outcomes at the ground level 
in their domain of influence (governance of land and natural resources).83  This 
indicates then, that although falling short of the production of ‘binding laws’ and 
the exercise of ‘administrative power’, the CFS is making important progress in 
its pursuit of ‘political centrality’. In the context of its emergence – the 
institutional fragmentation of transnational food and agricultural policy-making 
– this is important.   
 
However, it is also the case that many global policy entities simultaneously 
duplicate, ignore, or even contradict the work of the CFS in their own activities84, 
                                                        
82  McKeon (2015), p. 189; Duncan (2015), pp. 86, 222 & 226.  
83 Ruth Hall and Ian Scoones with Giles Henley,  ‘Strengthening Land Governance: Lessons from 
implementing the Voluntary Guidelines’, LEGEND State of the Debate Report (London: UK 
Department for International Development, 2016); Land Reform Review Group, ‘Land Reform 
Review Group Final Report - The Land of Scotland and the Common Good’, (2014), Available at 
{www.gov.scot/Resource/0045/00451087.pdf} accessed 2nd August 2016.  
84 One such initiative is the ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’. Launched at the 2012 
and 2013 G8 Summits in the US and UK, the New Alliance articulates corporations and donor 
countries with African countries to channel agricultural investment and promote policy change.  
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an outcome that in the eyes of some commentators clearly undermines the CFS’s 
‘mandate and legitimacy’.85 Intense resistance offered by some states to the CFS’s 
attempts to expand its discussions into the area of international food and 
agricultural trade, the domain of the World Trade Organization, provides 
another pertinent illustration of the challenge facing the CFS as it aspires for 
‘political centrality’.86  
 
Similar variability is evident in the CFS’s aspirations to operationalise ‘policy 
debate’. There can be no doubt that since its reform the CFS has maintained a 
prominent place for inclusive, sometimes heated dialogue involving state and 
non-state actors in its work. This dialogical ethos is sometimes referred to by 
member states as the ‘spirit’ of the CFS, and provides an environment that denies 
traction to more conventional diplomatic carrot and stick approaches, 
particularly evident in those moments when traditionally powerful states fail to 
strong-arm other states into alignment with their positions using such means.87 
However, it is also the case that the CFS exhibits significant uncertainty about 
how best to realise its aspirations for policy debate. One example of this is the 
general lack of clarity in the reformed CFS about the relationship between policy 
debate and decision-making authority, formally the preserve of member states. 
This ambiguity means that on some occasions, reflecting a prevailing tendency 
towards consensus promotion characteristic of UN processes, decisions are 
taken ‘up stream’88 to restrict the terms of a CFS debate in a way that eliminates 
potentially contentious topics or positions before they get to the wider 
membership. Unevenness in the chairing and facilitation skills of state 
representatives (who chair CFS policy processes and negotiations) also affects 
                                                                                                                                                              
It has been heavily critiqued by civil society for a lack of transparency and inclusivity, and for 
prioritising the interests of corporations over smallscale food producers and the food insecure.  
See: Nora McKeon, ‘The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: A Coup for Corporate 
Capital?’,  (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute (TNI), 2014. 
85 Duncan (2015), p.232. 
86 Duncan (2015), p. 226; Brem-Wilson (2012) p.244, It is important to note though that 
disagreements (between states, and between states and civil society) about the CFS’s political 
status were a feature of the reform process and are ongoing. Brem-Wilson (2012) p.214-219. The 
ongoing struggle by civil society, for instance, to establish a robust monitoring regime for the 
CFS’s work, and the resistance this has encountered, are perhaps one of the most recent 
examples of this.  
87  McKeon (2015), p. 183; Duncan (2015), p. 146. 
88 By the CFS secretariat and High Level Panel of Experts, for instance, both of which by being 
involved in the preparation of CFS reports and agendas have an opportunity to facilitate or 
suppress the discussion of potentially contentious issues.    
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the quality of policy debate in the CFS in a way that undermines its full 
potential.89  
 
It is perhaps in respect to the CFS’s aspirations for inclusivity where progress has 
been most clearly visible, particularly where civil society participation is 
concerned. As noted, the formal rights now enjoyed in the CFS by small-scale 
food producers and other rural, and food-insecure constituencies, are 
unprecedented in the history of UN-civil society relations. Civil society now 
literally sits side by side with state representatives, both in the CFS’s 
‘intersessional’ work, and its annual plenary. They participate in the governance 
of the CFS via their representation in the ‘Advisory Group’, a multi-stakeholder 
governance organ supporting the purely member state constituted Bureau. And 
they have operationalised the principle of civil society autonomy in their 
engagement with the CFS via their creation of a Civil Society Mechanism (to 
facilitate their participation in the CFS on an ongoing basis) and their 
management of their own participation in specific policy processes, such as that 
to formulate a set of Voluntary Guidelines on governance of natural resource 
tenure, adopted by the CFS in October 2012.90 
 
Compared to their historical experience in the meetings of the CFS and its host 
institution, the FAO, where their participation was largely episodic (confined to 
specific events such as the 2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform 
and Rural Development) or discretionary (depending on the chair of a specific 
meeting opening up floor space for them), these gains are profoundly 
significant.91 And crucially, civil society participants in the CFS have been able to 
see the impacts of their inclusion: shaping the terms of key debates, introducing 
new perspectives into the CFS’s work, and influencing the content of important 
CFS outcomes.92 Such instances of civil society impact on transnational policy-
making are extremely rare, and further underscore the unique character of the 
CFS. 93 However, progress here has also not been seamless. A civil society ‘walk 
out’ in 2011 in response to their exclusion from an important debate illustrates 
that the full realisation of their formal participation rights can still be dependent 
                                                        
89 Brem-Wilson (2011) p. 246; McKeon (2015), Duncan (2015).  
90 P. Seufert, 'The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests', Globalizations, 10:2 (2013). Pp. 181-186; CSM (International Food 
Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism), ‘What is the CSM?’, available at: 
{http://www.csm4cfs.org/about_us-2/what_is_the_csm-1/} accessed 3 April 2016. 
91 McKeon, Food Security Governance; McKeon, The UN and Civil Society. 
92 Duncan (2015), p .166; McKeon (2015), p. 168, p. 170.  
93 Steffek and Nanz (2008), p. 28.  
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upon the discretion of the individuals chairing CFS sessions at any given 
moment.94 
 
It is evident then that, although uneven, the post-reform CFS is making 
significant progress realising the promise contained within its reform blueprint 
in the three areas of relevance to public sphere theory. From the perspective of 
this article, and public sphere theory’s transnational turn, this is highly 
significant, because it means that we can indeed now recognise the existence of a 
nascent transnational public sphere, with the CFS providing its institutional 
component. The relationship between La Vía Campesina and the CFS, in other 
words, signal that it is possible to apply public sphere theory to the transnational 
in a way that is neither utopian, nor which requires a dilution of its critical 
theoretical potential. In regards to this latter concern, this means that we don’t 
have to abandon public sphere theory’s normative conditions in order to 
recognise the democratic potential of the LVC-CFS dynamic. Indeed, far from 
requiring a dilution of its critical theoretical potential, the LVC-CFS relationship 
allows us to develop this critical theoretical potential further, by applying public 
sphere theory to an ongoing evaluation of the degree to which that democratic 
potential is continuing to be fulfilled, or failed. I am talking here about the 
development of an empirical research agenda for public sphere theory’s 
transnational turn, something that has been lacking at both the national, and 
transnational level.95   
 
For example, examining the CFS’s aspirations to be a site of policy debate could 
involve focusing more precisely upon the deliberative processes that unfolds 
within its various arenas, specifically the ways in which (policy) norms become 
established and contested therein. Or, focusing on the CFS’s aspirations to be 
politically central, it would seem particularly important to identify whether the 
CFS’s inclusion of marginal and resource-poor stakeholders has any bearing 
upon the impact of the policy instruments that it generates, for better or worse. 
Whatever the area of focus selected, some degree of methodological bracketing 
will be required, so as to enable focus on one area at a time. It is essential to 
recognise, however, that no individual area is more important than another as an 
indicator of progress towards the full realisation of the CFS’s potential. Each is 
necessary to the realisation of that potential, but not sufficient. For instance, it 
                                                        
94  Marie Clarke (née Brill), ‘And We Walked Out…Conclusion of the Food Price Volatility Work at 
the CFS’, ActionAid Website, available at: {http://www.actionaid.org/2011/10/and-we-walked-
out-conclusion-food-price-volatility-work-cfs} accessed 30 October 2011.  
95 Van Der Heijden (2010) p. 200.  
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might be that the CFS does go on to establish itself as the ‘central political space’ 
for food security policy-making at the global level96 but that all of its decisions 
are the result of non-discursive influence (e.g. backroom deals amongst the most 
powerful states). Or, inversely, the CFS might establish itself as a forum of policy 
debate to the satisfaction of all interested parties, but remain politically 
irrelevant. In either case the CFS will have realised an attribute that is necessary, 
but not sufficient for the attainment of its potential as the institutional 
component of a transnational public sphere.  
 
4. Extending the focus: From formal to effective participation  
 
Extending this forward focus, one particularly important task to which attention 
will have to be given involves tracking the quality of participation attained in the 
CFS by civil society organisations representing affected publics, such as La Vía 
Campesina and other transnational social movements. Specifically, it will be 
crucial to identify whether these actors are managing to convert their formal 
right to participate in the CFS’s work, into effective participation. The importance 
of this task follows from recognising that such effective participation in 
transnational policy processes necessitates the attaining of certain ‘entry 
requirements’, including an ability to manage potentially large quantities of 
knowledge and information, deploy specialist language, and negotiate sometimes 
complex institutional dynamics. 97  And the task of meeting these entry 
requirements is especially difficult for non-elites, who are disadvantaged, for 
instance, by resource asymmetries vis-à-vis other constituencies.98 
 
And indeed, whilst no systematic analysis of these dynamics has been conducted 
so far99, there are indications that these expanded participation opportunities 
are posing serious challenges to precisely those actors whose participation is so 
important to realising the radical inclusivity of the CFS: smallscale food 
producers and other rural, and food insecure constituencies. For such actors, 
limited in resources, such dynamics within the CFS as the monopoly of the 
English language, the importance of electronically mediated participation, the 
timescales and rhythms of participation, and the generally increased 
                                                        
96 The optimal form of which is subject to debate. McKeon (2015) p. 204. 
97 Nanz and Steffek (2004), p. 323.  
98 Bexell et al (2010), p. 87.  
99 By systematic, I mean maintaining a singular and consistent focus upon the ‘knowledge object’ 
of civil society participation in the CFS, and particularly their attempts to convert their formal 
right to participate into effective or substantive participation.  
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organisational requirements of effective participation are all generating 
significant obstacles.100  Indeed, La Vía Campesina themselves have spoken of the 
‘huge challenge’ that confronts them as they now seek effective participation in 
this new context.101 
 
From the perspective of public sphere theory, the challenges faced by these 
actors should perhaps come as no surprise. Since at least as far back as 
Habermas’s assertion that the Bourgeois Public Sphere embodied certain 
‘institutional criteria’ that meant that the ‘authority of the better argument’ was 
liberated therein from social, economic, and political power102, public sphere 
theorists have been interrogating the relationship between ‘social position and 
political voice’.103 One central insight emerging from this body of work concerns 
the ways in which the properties of discursive arenas (arenas for communicative 
exchanges), particularly their informal properties, function to empower the 
participation of some, whilst disempowering others.104   
 
Transposed to the CFS, this insight anticipates that for the newly admitted actors 
seeking to represent smallscale food producers and other non-elites in its work, 
challenges confronting their attempt to convert their formal right to participate 
into substantive, or effective participation, are inevitable. Given that the 
attainment of the CFS’s unprecedented aspirations for inclusivity, (and, by 
extension, the realisation of the CFS’s potential to fulfil the institutional 
component of the nascent transnational public sphere delineated within this 
article), are dependent in part upon La Vía Campesina and other representatives 
of affected publics being able to participate effectively in the CFS, it is vitally 
important that we track, analytically, what these challenges are, and how they 
can and are being overcome. In order to develop this point further, in the final 
                                                        
100 La Vía Campesina, ‘The Committee on World Food Security (CFS): A New Space for the Food 
Policies of the World: Opportunities and Limitations’, available at:  
{www.viacampesina.org/dl/click.php?id=44} accessed 9 December 2013; Kate Eklin et al., ‘The 
Committee on World Food Security Reform: Impacts on Global Governance of Food Security’, 
Working Papers n°03/14 (Iddri, Paris, France, 2014). 
101 La Vía Campesina (2013) p. 2. 
102 Habermas (1989) p.36.  
103 Fraser (2007) p. 18.  
104  Calhoun (2010) p. 323; Fraser (1990) p. 63. This insight is also present in the idea, within 
Critical Discourse Analysis, that individual participants in a discursive process can be 
differentiated according to their ‘discourse access profile’ T. A. van Dijk, ‘Principles of Critical 
Discourse Analysis’, Discourse & Society, 4:2 (1993), p. 256.  
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section of this article I will outline a framework to conduct such an analysis. This 
will unfold via the assertion of two propositions.105  
 
i. Proposition one 
 
 The articulation of communication flows from the periphery of informal or 
affected publics, via their direct participation, with (transnational) policy-making, 
necessitates their attainment of certain conditions: the Requisites of Effective 
Participation.  
 
For example, at a minimum, to communicate the perspectives106 of their 
constituencies, and critically debate and shape formal policy processes, civil 
society participants in the CFS need to have some idea of what is being discussed, 
how this might potentially affect their constituency, and what that wider 
constituency’s aspirations are for the policy-issue under consideration107 
Likewise, to be able to take up their formal right to participate in the CFS, 
smallscale food producers and other rural and food insecure constituencies need 
to be able to travel to the location of its meetings (usually Rome), and once there, 
know how to gain entry into actual discussions (i.e. negotiate the protocols and 
procedures of an intergovernmental arena). And, furthermore, successful 
interventions in such spaces require that the participants are psychologically, 
emotionally and physically comfortable with the scales and modes of 
participation; can communicate their perspectives and positions is a way that 
gains traction with other interlocutors in the arena; and enjoy a commitment to 
be heard from those same interlocutors, particularly the decision-makers: 
member states.  
 
In short, we can say then that the Requisites of Effective Participation, comprise: 
 Attaining spatial and temporal convergence with the arena; 
                                                        
105 The insights developed here are the result of seven years of analysis, observation and 
engagement with the dynamics of civil society participation in transnational food and agricultural 
policy-making and governance spaces, with public sphere theory providing an overarching 
theoretical reference for most of that time. Brem-Wilson, (2012, 2015).  
106 Bohman (2010).  
107 Anne Marie Goetz and John Gaventa, ‘Bringing Citizen Voice and Client Focus into Service 
Delivery’, IDS Working Paper 138, (Brighton: IDS, 2001), p.47; Jan A. Scholte, Democratizing the 
Global Economy: The Role of Civil Society’, (University of Warwick: Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation, 2004), p.19; M. Menser, Transnational Participatory 
Democracy in Action: The Case of La Vía Campesina, Journal of Social Philosophy, 39:1 (2008), p. 
22.  
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 Communicating intelligibly and persuasively; 
 Being informed (about what is being discussed and how it potentially 
affects your constituency); 
 Being (physically, emotionally and psychologically) comfortable with 
participation in the arena; and 
 Being recognised as having the right to speak (by the other interlocutors 
in the arena).108 
 
These conditions embody a notion of effective participation informed in the first 
instance by public sphere theory’s insistence that legitimate political decision-
making hinges upon the articulation of communication flows from informal with 
formal publics.109 To put it another way, they address the question: If the 
articulation between global formal and informal publics is going to be achieved 
by the formal participation of the latter in the arenas of the former, then what 
conditions have to be achieved? Crucially, they have to be situated within an 
awareness of the fact that such participation is representative participation, and 
necessitates for those coming up into the intergovernmental milieu a constant 
bridging of the formal and informal spheres. Thus, being informed would entail 
the representative of the affected public (e.g. smallholder food producers) both 
understanding the policy issue under consideration, but also, importantly, how it 
affected them and their constituency. This might well entail regular consultation 
between the global level representative and the wider constituency. Historically, 
La Vía Campesina representatives have vigilantly guarded their right to be in 
ongoing dialogue with their grassroots membership.110 This has naturally 
affected their ability to respond to the tight rhythms of intergovernmental policy 
processes, causing frustration even amongst so-called sympathetic UN 
officials.111 The point here is simply that this dual responsibility to the exigencies 
of effective participation in the arena, on the one hand, and the core 
constituency, on the other, create tensions that need to be negotiated moving 
forwards. 
 
                                                        
108 See Brem-Wilson (2015) pp. 12-16 for a wider overview of the Requisites of Effective 
Participation in policy-relevant discursive processes. 
109 But are convergent with the aspirations, on the one hand, for La Vía Campesina to channel the 
‘voice’ of ‘the peasant movement’ in the ‘global debates on agrarian policy’, and on the other the 
reformed CFS to include smallscale food producers and other rural, and food insecure 
constituencies in a politically relevant policy debate. 
110 Annette Desmarais, La Vía Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants, (London: 
Pluto Press, 2007), p. 28.  
111 Field Notes, Rome, Sep 2009.  
 31 
 
ii. Proposition two 
 
These are abstract conditions of effective participation, but, as has been alluded 
to above, their attainment, or not, is in part a matter of engaging with, and 
working through concrete participatory opportunities embodied in a specific 
arena and its processes. For example, in the case of the CFS, to attain spatial and 
temporal convergence requires, most of the time, travelling to Rome. To 
communicate intelligibly and persuasively demands, at minimum, speaking one 
of FAO’s six official languages.112  And often, particularly outside of formal 
meetings, it requires speaking English. And to be psychologically comfortable 
with participation in the arena and its processes requires, in the case of the CFS’s 
plenary meetings certainly, an ability to speak before an audience of several 
hundred people, most of whom are global elites (diplomats, senior politicians, 
and UN and national officials) and other ‘policy professionals’.113  
 
Needless to say, if you are deficient in the specific capacities that are required by 
the participatory opportunities embodied in an arena like the CFS, then either 
you can’t participate, or your participation will be comprised. For example, if an 
aspirant interlocutor doesn’t speak one of FAO’s official languages, then she can’t 
communicate in CFS meetings. In the context of the framework that I am 
discussing here, she would be identified as experiencing an REP deficit. And 
similarly, if an aspirant participant in the CFS is already overstretched in terms 
of time and workload (capacity), and if briefing documents and agendas are 
released very near to the dates of actual meetings (participatory opportunity), 
then she won’t be able to become informed about the meeting, and its potential 
implications for her constituency (REP outcome). 
 
Capacity is not, however, the only agent-centric attribute that bears upon the 
quality of an interlocutor’s ‘take up’ of the participatory opportunities within an 
arena like the CFS. Participatory preferences are also key. Intelligible 
communication, for example, extends beyond the need to be clear to one’s 
interlocutors. It also necessitates being true to what one is trying to say. The CFS 
is an intergovernmental arena, and operates within a specific ‘genre’114, a 
                                                        
112  English, Spanish, French, Russian, Arabic, and Chinese. 
113 Diane Stone, ‘Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and their Networks’, 
Policy Studies Journal, 36:1 (2008), pp. 19–38. 
114 N. Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, International Advances in Engineering and 
Technology, 7 (2012), p. 456.  
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particular style of speaking that is characteristic of the diplomatic milieu. Such 
formal-technical ‘conventionalised discourses’ impose particular constraints 
upon those who work within them.115 For representatives of marginalised, or 
subaltern constituencies, who may pursue very different ‘strategies of 
representation’116, such discourses might therefore frustrate their efforts at 
intelligible communication by denying them the opportunity for accurate self-
expression. Indeed, in the specific history of civil society’s engagements with 
formal intergovernmental processes of food and agricultural policy-making, 
there have been instances when officials, only familiar with La Vía Campesina via 
their participation in the formal spaces, upon entering their autonomous 
discursive arenas have become conscious of until then not quite understanding 
what the movement is, and what it has been trying to say.117  
 
And finally, it is also important to recognise that along with capacity, on the one 
hand, and participatory preferences, on the other, identity is also significant as a 
factor that affects an individual’s ability and willingness to engage successfully 
with arena-specific participatory opportunities. For example, recognition of the 
right to speak requires in the case of an arena like the CFS, at a minimum, the 
formal right to participate in its meetings and spaces. Those without this formal 
right cannot participate (they would not even get past security at FAO 
headquarters, the location of the CFS). Beyond this, however, to be able to debate 
and contest with a potential interlocutor (such as member states) requires of 
that potential interlocutor a willingness to extend to you a commitment to hear 
you speak. Indeed, for Habermas, the successful enactment of the public sphere 
needs to go beyond this, in that in requires affected publics’ attainment of 
‘communicative freedom’, which entails: 
 
                                                        
115 Anna Holzscheiter, Children’s Rights in International Politics: The Transformative Power of 
Discourse (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 30; Ruth Wodak, ‘The discourse-historical 
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116 Michael E. Gardiner, ‘Wild Publics and Grotesque Symposiums: Habermas and Bakhtin on 
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[T]he possibility – mutually presupposed by participants engaged in the 
effort to reach understanding – of responding to the utterances of one’s 
counterpart and to the concomitantly raised validity claims.118 
 
This delineates the necessity of a specific attitude or ‘illocutionary obligation’, on 
the part of one’s interlocutor (member states), including their willingness to 
justify the ‘validity claims’ raised within a particular speech act, or, by extension, 
policy decision or framing. Identity is relevant here because even amongst those 
who have made it into the room, differences in identity connected to gender, 
race, class, age, and more, have very significant impacts upon who gets to speak, 
when they get to speak, who gets listened to, and who gets responded to.119  
 
In summary, we can recognise then that in the first instance the attainment or 
not of the Requisites of Effective Participation is a result of the dynamic interplay 
between agent-centric (capacities, identity, and participatory preferences) and 
arena-specific (participatory opportunity) properties. If, for instance, a 
participant’s capacities (e.g. language skills, financial resources, time, 
knowledge) are insufficient to negotiate a particular participatory opportunity, 
then the result will be a REP deficit. It is important to also recognise, however, 
that distance between the agent and the arena can be bridged through the 
provision of third party facilitation. This might involve the delivery of financial 
resources, trainings, interpretation or translation services, briefing documents 
and policy guides, organisational capacity, and more. In the context of the CFS 
this insight is particular important, because it recognises the roles that are very 
much being played there by NGOs, who via their membership of the CSM support 
social movement and affected public participation through the provision of much 
of the above.120 
 
Carrying these insights forward, the second proposition asserts then that:  
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REP outcomes are a result of the degree of convergence between the 
capacities, participatory preferences and identity of the actor, the participatory 
opportunities within the arena, and the degree of third party facilitation that is 
available to make up any divergence between the two.  
 
The framework outlined above communicates that different actors (who vary 
according to their capacities, participatory preferences, identities and access to 
facilitation) will experience the same participatory opportunities differently. It 
therefore underscores the importance of specific attention to the ongoing efforts 
of smallscale food producers, and other non-elite civil society constituencies, 
seeking to convert their formal right to participate in the CFS into effective 
participation.  Such a disaggregated approach (i.e. disaggregating these actors 
from NGOs, and other non-state actors formally entitled to participate in the CFS) 
is key to understanding what challenges they face, and how and if these are being 
overcome. Equally important, however, is the need to also capture the 
experiences of actors from the other constituencies formally entitled to 
participate in the CFS, including the private sector; representatives from other 
UN agencies with mandates in food; and representatives from International 
Financial Institutions. This comparative analysis would enable differentiation 
between those challenges that are uniquely being faced by smallscale food 
producers, and other non-elite civil society constituencies, and those that are 
being encountered by a wider range of constituencies, and are therefore more 
like to be ‘arena-specific’.  
 
The REP framework, however, is not just a methodology for analysing non-elite 
participation in a transnational policy processes. It also identifies three different 
types of intervention that are potentially available to address REP deficits. For 
example, if the participatory opportunity within the arena is speaking English, 
and the aspirant participant only speaks Spanish, then one route to remedying 
this REP deficit would be via the addition of Spanish as a formal, interpreted 
language within the arena. Alternately, another route would be the potential 
participant learning English. And finally, it would also be possible for a third 
party (e.g., a civil society ally) to facilitate the potential participant’s 
participation by providing interpretation services themselves. These three 
responses indicate the three different routes to remedying REP deficit: arena-
adjustment; actor-adjustment; and facilitation. To use another example, in the 
case of converging spatially and temporally with the arena, if the participatory 
opportunity involved travelling to Rome, and the actor lacked sufficient capacity 
to achieve this, the three potential responses are: changing the location of the 
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meeting to accommodate the actor’s capacity (arena-adjustment); the actor 
reallocating resources to enable their journey (actor-adjustment); and, a third 
party providing the funds for the journey (facilitation).  
 
The recognition of these three potential routes is especially crucial in a context 
where historically civil society have been responsible for making up the gap 
between themselves and the formal sphere of UN/transnational food and 
agricultural policy-making.121 Typically, such bridging creates the danger of 
‘professionalisation’, or adaptation to the modes of working and speaking 
prevalent in the institutional arena.122 This dynamic generates at least two key 
concerns. Firstly, if effective participation is attainable only by those actors 
capable or willing to adjust to the intergovernmental milieu, then this, by 
excluding the great many actors who can’t or won’t adjust, greatly constrains the 
democratic potential of such arrangements, where democratic legitimacy hinges 
upon the effective participation of affected publics in key decision-making and 
policy processes. Secondly, even and perhaps especially when adaptation is 
successfully undergone, this creates the risk of ‘estrangement’ between the 
nominal representative, and the constituencies and communities they are meant 
to be representing (though of course, as is captured in Table 1, none of the 
potential routes to remedying an REP deficit is without risk).123 Thus, given its 
historical absence, but potential value, a key goal for the analysis of the 
democratic potential within institutional innovations such as that embodied in 
the reformed CFS concerns the identification of actual instances of, or potential 
for, arena adjustment to enable the participation of affected publics.  
 
This would involve, for example, identifying if institutional process managers - 
the diplomats and officials who collectively manage and shape the dynamics of 
meetings - are willing to accommodate or initiate arena adjustment. Or to put it 
another way, this would entail capturing the degree to which institutional 
process managers are able to denaturalise the modes and structures of 
                                                        
121  McKeon (2009a), p. 89. Martens, for example, also notes the tendency of the UN to privilege 
interaction with civil society organisations that are ‘formally organized’, one consequence of 
which is a lack of real contact with social movements ‘that lack formal organizational provisions’. 
Kerstin Martens, ‘Civil Society and Accountability in the United Nations’,  in Scholte (2011), p. 54. 
122 Gerlinde Mautner, ‘Language and Communication Design in the Marketplace’, in Ruth Wodak 
and Veronika Koller (eds), Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere (New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 131–154. 
123 A. Holzscheiter, ‘Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance’, 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 33:3 (2005), p. 746; Pierre Bourdieu,  ‘Language 
and Symbolic Power’ trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp.172-183.  
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participation that perhaps most accommodate their own capacities, identities 
and participatory preferences. Particularly important in this regard will be 
identification of the conditions under which arena adjustment does, or could take 
place. For example, at the CFS in 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was 
afforded the opportunity to engage with the plenary via webcast.124 Perhaps this 
instance of arena adjustment was connected to high recognition amongst 
institutional process managers of the UNS-G’s right to speak and, indeed, the fact 
that his participation confers increased legitimacy on the CFS as it seeks to 
establish itself as a politically central global level food security coordination 
mechanism. Whether this was the case or not, the question is: Are institutional 
process managers in the CFS willing to adjust the participatory opportunities 
within its arenas and processes to enable the participation of affected publics 
therein? The answer to this question has profound implications for the 
democratic potential of the CFS, and beyond.125  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this article I discussed how the project of transposing 
public sphere theory to the transnational had been impeded by a lack of concrete 
examples in which the properties of either nascent or existing transnational 
public spheres can be easily recognised. I noted two consequences of this: Firstly, 
it renders those promoting public sphere’s transnational turn susceptible to the 
charge of utopianism, to the suggestion that they are advancing a political project 
with little chance of realisation. And secondly, it leads to some suspending or 
modifying some of the framework’s core conditions in order to accommodate the 
‘actually possible’, with a subsequent diminishment of the framework’s critical 
theoretical potential. Recognising these concerns, in this article I have 
contributed to public sphere theory’s transnational turn by arguing for the 
                                                        
124 The fact that concrete articulation with a policy discussion can be attained via a range of 
different means (including electronically or virtually), and involving various types of relationship 
between actor and arena, is why this category is labeled somewhat abstractly as ‘attaining spatial 
and temporal convergence’. 
125 Three years after the reform the evidence suggested they were not: ‘[T]he CFS is an 
established and formal governance space that operates under formal UN procedures. Thus, while 
the CFS is in favour of including those most affected by food security, the organization structure, 
financial mechanisms and the political culture have yet to fully adapt to facilitate their 
involvement.’ J. Duncan and D. Barling, ‘Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security 
Governance: Implementing the International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society 
Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security’, International Journal of Sociology of 
Agriculture & Food, 19:2 (2012), p. 157. 
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existence of a nascent transnational public pivoting on the encounter between La 
Vía Campesina (and other transnational agrarian movements) and the UN 
Committee on World Food Security. As I have demonstrated, the existence of this 
case study illustrates that it is possible to apply public sphere theory to the 
transnational in a way that is neither utopian nor which requires a suspension of 
its critical theoretical potential. Moreover, as I make clear, the existence of a 
concrete example of a nascent transnational public sphere does more than 
simply defend public sphere theory’s transnational turn against the concerns 
identified above. It also promotes that transnational turn by advancing public 
sphere theory’s empirical research agenda, and along with this concrete case 
study I contribute to the development of this empirical research agenda by 
providing an analytical framework that will allow us to take that further.  
 
I will conclude this paper, drawing from the previous discussion, by identifying 
the three different ways in which public sphere theory can be ‘applied’ to the 
transnational. My goal here is to help clarify the contribution of this article, but 
also clarify the contribution of public sphere theory to ongoing scholarly 
interrogation of the democratic potential of the transnational, the project of 
which forms the wider context for this paper.  
 
Firstly, public sphere theory is an interpretive lens. It helps us to identify what is 
happening, or has happened, in the world, and particularly the democratic, or 
‘emancipatory’ significance of this.126 Historically this has been demonstrated in 
the recognition by those working within public sphere theory of the democratic 
significance of 18th century coffee houses, or bourgeois cultural forms, or the 
autonomous discursive practices of marginal or subordinate collectives, or 
institutional reforms that permit a greater articulation between political 
decision-making and discursive activity amongst affected publics, and so on.127 In 
this article, its value as an interpretive lens has allowed us to recognise the 
unique democratic significance of both the emergence of transnationally active 
affected public such as La Vía Campesina, and the reformed UN Committee on 
World Food Security.  
 
Secondly, public sphere theory is an evaluative framework. Its normative 
conditions enable us to not just interpret the world, but also to evaluate it.128 In 
this article, I have introduced an analytical framework that amplifies public 
                                                        
126 Nash (2014) p. 60; Crack (2008) p. 197.  
127 Habermas (1989); Fraser (1990).  
128 Couldry (2014) p. 44;  Crack (2008) p. 197. 
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sphere theory’s evaluative potential. It does this by translating the vaguely 
articulated norm that political decision-making should articulate with 
communication flows emanating from affected publics into a framework for 
identifying the degree to which this is happening – via the direct participation of 
affected publics in its work – in the CFS. The application of public sphere theory 
as an evaluative framework to an analysis of empirical dynamics is another way 
of describing public sphere theory’s empirical research agenda. This article – by 
recognising a nascent transnational public sphere and providing an analytical 
framework to identify the degree to which the CFS is fulfilling its potential as its 
institutional component – advances that empirical research agenda. It is 
important to note however that not discussing a data set itself this article merely 
represents a dynamic, though incomplete, mid-way point between the present 
state of public sphere theory’s transnational turn, and the full realisation of the 
empirical research agenda, the possibility of which has been enabled by this 
article in a small but significant way. 
 
And finally, public sphere theory is a visionary tool. That is, it enables us to derive 
from its normative conditions ideas for the world that, although not correlating 
at present with the way the world is constructed, signal an important trajectory 
of future travel or development. We can see this aspect of public sphere theory at 
work, for example, in Nancy Fraser’s ambitious call for the creation of ‘new 
public powers’ capable of fulfilling the institutional requirements for a 
transnational public sphere.129 It is also perhaps partly visible in the recent 
history of public sphere theory’s transnational turn, which, by entertaining the 
possibility of a transnational public sphere in the absence of evidence of one 
actually existing, has provoked an accusation of utopianism.130 In this article I 
have not engaged with aspect of public sphere theory at all, and indeed, by 
identifying a case study in which the properties of a nascent public sphere theory 
can be recognised, have sought to defend its transnational turn from this 
allegation. That is, I have demonstrated that it can be applied to the transnational 
in both its interpretive and evaluative modes, and by so doing hope I have 
advanced the contribution of public sphere theory to a theoretically informed, 
critical interrogation of the democratic potential of the transnational.131  
                                                        
129 Fraser (2007) p. 23. A call that in this article I have argued the CFS to a significant extent 
responds to.  
130 Whilst perhaps the allegation of utopianism has been most conspicuously leveled at Nancy 
Fraser, it is important to note that she is acutely aware of the dangers of an ideological approach 
to social analysis, and stresses the need to avoid this. Fraser (2007) p. 8.  
131 The need for which has been recognised by, amongst others, Steffek and Nanz (2008), p. 9. 
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Requisite of 
Effective 
Participation 
(REP) 
Participatory 
Opportunity 
within the CFS 
Example of 
REP Deficit 
Example of 
Response: 
Actor-
adjustment 
(Burden 
carried by the 
participant):  
Example of 
Response: 
Facilitation 
(Burden 
carried by third 
party):  
Example of 
Response: 
Arena-
adjustment 
(Burden 
carried by the 
arena):  
Attaining 
spatial and 
temporal 
convergence 
with the arena 
Meeting in 
Rome.  
Interlocutor 
lacks time 
and 
resources 
for flights to 
Rome and 
accommoda
tion. 
Free up time, 
obtain more 
money. 
 
 
 
Risk: 
Opportunity 
Cost. Actor’s 
participation in 
other 
strategically 
important 
processes is 
compromised. 
Provision of 
financial 
support by 
sympathetic 
government, 
institution, or 
ally.  
 
Risk:  
Actor 
potentially 
loses control 
over the means 
of their 
effective 
participation.  
Relocation of 
meeting to 
accommodate 
actor’s 
capacity 
constraints.  
 
 
Risk: 
Subsidiary 
meeting fails 
to 
meaningfully 
articulate 
with formal 
meeting.  
Communi-
cating in a 
manner that is 
a) intelligible, 
and b) 
persuasive to 
other 
interlocutors 
Speaking in 
CFS’s six formal 
languages 
(English, 
Spanish, 
French, Arabic, 
Russian, 
Chinese) 
Interlocutor 
doesn’t 
speak 
formal 
language of 
arena 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learn formal 
language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk:  
Organisation’s 
or 
constituency’s 
effective 
participation 
hinges upon 
availability of 
specific 
Provision of 
additional 
interpretation 
services  
 
 
 
 
 
Risk: 
Actor 
potentially 
loses control 
over the 
conditions of 
their 
participation. 
 
Creation of 
subsidiary 
meetings that 
allow for 
participation 
in native 
discursive 
modes. 
 
Risk: 
 Subsidiary 
meeting fails 
to 
meaningfully 
articulate 
with formal 
meeting. 
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individuals 
with required 
language skills; 
interlocutor 
becomes 
detached from 
those whom 
she is meant to 
be 
representing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Examples of REP deficits, remedies and risks in two areas.  
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